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This article presents a history of the early electroencephalography (EEG) of psychopathy,
delinquency, and immorality in Great Britain and the United States in the 1940s and 1950s.
Then, EEG was a novel research tool that promised ground-breaking insights in psychiatry
and criminology. Experts explored its potential regarding the diagnosis, classification,
etiology, and treatment of unethical and unlawful persons. This line of research yielded
tentative and inconsistent findings, which the experts attributed to methodological and
theoretical shortcomings. Accordingly, the scientific community discussed the reliability,
validity, and utility of EEG, and launched initiatives to calibrate and standardize the
novel tool. The analysis shows that knowledge production, gauging of the research tool,
and attempts to establish credibility for EEG in the study of immoral persons occurred
simultaneously. The paper concludes with a reflection on the similarities between EEG
and neuroimaging—the prime research tool in the current neuroscience of morality—and
calls for a critical assessment of their potentials and limitations in the study of immorality
and crime.
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INTRODUCTION
“Presumably prisons harbor many persons afflicted not with
moral turpitude but with disordered brain waves which require
chemical therapy, or, for the protection of society, eugenic pro-
phylaxis.” (Lennox, 1942, p. 594, emphasis added)
In 1942, William Gordon Lennox, a pioneer of epilepsy research
at Harvard Medical School, surmized that researching disordered
brain waves could revolutionize the understanding of immoral-
ity. Lennox’ anticipation was incited by a recently invented
technology that visualized brain activity: electroencephalography
(EEG). Approximately 70 years later, modern neuroscience has
appropriated immorality and delinquency as viable objects of
research. Especially the emergence of neuroimaging technology
in the last two decades facilitated research on the good, the bad,
and the brain. According to some, a revolution in understand-
ing morality is on its way (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Fumagalli
and Priori, 2012). Both technologies—EEG and neuroimaging—
have opened up new epistemic spaces, unlocked new phenom-
ena, spurred research, generated promises of scientific progress,
encountered methodological problems, and attracted diverse crit-
icism (Borck, 2005a; Schleim and Roiser, 2009; Choudhury and
Slaby, 2012; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). Both technologies
afforded unprecedented empirical access to the living brains of
wrongdoers and generated hopes for imminent solutions for the
intractable problem of immorality. This resemblance is worth
exploring.
The hype surrounding both technologies has to be under-
stood in historical, social, political context for it influenced
their potential for deployment as well as their capability to
provide solutions for social problems (Hayward, 2001; Borck,
2005a; Alder, 2007; Ortega and Vidal, 2011; Bunn, 2012). While
neuroimaging research has received copious scholarly attention
(Dumit, 2004; Littlefield, 2009; Choudhury and Slaby, 2012), the
history of EEG of psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality has
not been addressed with sufficient detail yet. Historical work in
the area only touches upon the issue (Borck, 2005a; Rafter, 2008;
Verplaetse, 2009; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013; Pickersgill, 2014).
How were “the wondrous eyes of a new technology” (Syndulko,
1978, p. 145) constructed, used, and appraised? Answering this
question provides valuable insights into the potentials and limita-
tions of brain science—then and now.
In this paper, I present a history of early EEG research on psy-
chopathy, delinquency, and immorality in Great Britain and the
United States in the 1940s and 1950s. Though different histo-
ries could be written, my focus is on the experts’ appraisal of the
new research tool, the associated problems and proposed solu-
tions. The paper commences with a sketch of the complex history
of somatic immorality and the state of Anglo Saxon psychiatry
in the 1940s. Subsequently, the heterogeneous concept of psy-
chopathy along with its moral connotation and the emergence
of EEG as a tool for psychiatric research are described. The body
of the paper specifies the role of EEG in the diagnosis, classifica-
tion, etiology, and treatment of unethical and unlawful persons.
Though initially experts had high hopes for the new technology
in this field, they soon realized that its use involved methodolog-
ical problems. EEG, then, was a novel, unstandardized research
tool still under development. The experts were uncertain and
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at odds regarding its proper application and the interpretation
and utilization of the generated data. Uncertainty and dissension
pervaded EEG research onmisdemeanants. The research commu-
nity tried to manage this uncertainty through developing research
standards, devising criteria for the interpretation of data, refining
the technology, discussing the validity of EEG, and acknowledg-
ing the tentativeness of their findings. The analysis shows that
knowledge production, calibration of the research tool, and the
establishment of credibility of the new technology in the study of
immoral persons occurred simultaneously. The paper concludes
with a reflection on the past and present of the brain science of
morality, arguing that persistent methodological and theoretical
problems already inherent in early EEG research call the merit of
modern neuroimaging technology into question.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
SOMATIC IMMORALITY—A LONG HISTORY
Immorality has to be understood in context—as well as corre-
sponding mental disorder concepts and their putative biological
manifestations. Ideas on a hereditary, physiological, or neuro-
logical basis for anti-sociality, violence, and crime have a long
and multifarious history (Rafter, 2008). In the course of the
19th century, bio-medical theories on the genesis and prolif-
eration of immorality emerged from early psychiatry, criminal
anthropology, and Social Darwinism. Diverse moral transgres-
sions (ranging from promiscuity over alcoholism to murder)
were re-conceptualized and treated as biological disease. The
focus on criminals’ bodies and brains gave rise to a new class
of medical experts, new discourses on guilt, and new options
for policing and controlling badness. Against this backdrop, bio-
medicine offered solutions for themanagement of society, e.g., via
eugenics (Smith, 1981; Richards, 1987; Wiener, 1990; Becker and
Wetzell, 2006; Schirmann, 2013a). Although bio-medical views
on immorality and crime had been continuously criticized on
scientific, social, and political grounds, they still constituted an
explanatory resource within British and American psychiatry in
the 1940s and 1950s. At that time, the field was dominated by
biological and psychodynamic views, which often mixed in the
description of anti-sociality (Shorter, 1997; Wallace and Gach,
2008; Pickersgill, 2010). Various classification systems for mental
disorder co-existed. Experts advocated different nosologies and
etiologies, reflecting their training and theoretical commitments.
The publication of the firstDiagnostic and StatisticalManual of the
American Psychiatric Association (DSM) in 1952 was an attempt
to homogenize classification. Among others, the definition of one
particular mental disorder was arduous: psychopathy.
THE CONCEPT OF PSYCHOPATHY—AWASTEBASKET WITH MORAL
OVERTONES
“It is a confusing term; it is misleading, and it means nothing.” [Dr.
James J. Ryan at a meeting of the Philadelphia Psychiatric Society
(see Matthews, 1949, p. 872)]
Who is a psychopath? What is psychopathy? These questions were
indelibly intertwined. Identifying psychopaths required a defini-
tion of the condition. In the 1940s, definitions were plentiful—
and contradictory. Since its origination in nineteenth century
Germany, the term psychopathic had acquired multiple mean-
ings, designating a host of different people and mental conditions
(Werlinder, 1978; Sass and Herpertz, 1995; Wetzell, 2000). The
notorious ambiguity of the concept expressed itself in multi-
ple manifestations (e.g., psychopathic inferiority, psychopathic
personality, constitutional psychopathic state). In 1923, at a sym-
posium initiated by Benjamin Karpman, who would later become
one of Americas leading experts on psychopathy, the concept
was called “a wastebasket into which all sorts of things have
been thrown” (cited in Werlinder, 1978, p. 147). In the follow-
ing decades, the psychiatric community on both sides of the
Atlantic almost unanimously criticized the equivocality of the
concept (Partridge, 1930; Curran and Mallinson, 1944; Preu,
1944; Gurvitz, 1951). Some psychiatrists even called for its abol-
ishment: in 1948, Karpman stated that psychopathy has become
so diluted that “what remains is a myth and is a non-existent
entity” (Karpman, 1948, p. 527).
The vacuity of the concept in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s
called for clarification. Several definitions, classifications, and
typologies emerged (for bibliographies, see Maughs, 1941, 1955;
Hare and Hare, 1967). For example in Great Britain, Henderson
(1939) proposed three types of psychopaths: a predominantly
aggressive, a predominantly passive or inadequate, and a pre-
dominantly creative type. In the United States, Partridge’s (1930)
sociopath (codified in the first DSM in 1952) as well as Cleckley’s
(1955/1941) and Karpman’s (e.g., 1947, 1948) work on the con-
cept were seminal (for overviews, see Sass and Herpertz, 1995;
Hervé, 2007). These attempted conceptual refinements occurred
simultaneously with an increment in research: whereas 28 arti-
cles in English appeared on psychopathy from 1930 to 1940, 171
articles were published from 1940 to 1955 (see also Cason, 1948;
see McCord and McCord, 1956, p. 9). Apparently the concept
attracted researchers’ attention; but the question remained: what
characterized the psychopath?
Despite ambiguity, many definitions converged on the pres-
ence of persistent anti-social, immoral, and illegal conduct
(Curran and Mallinson, 1944; Preu, 1944; Darling, 1945;
East, 1945). Several classifications of psychopathic personali-
ties contained a distinct anti-social or amoral type, such as
East’s (1945) ethical aberrant personalities or Karpman’s (1948)
anethopaths. These persons’ callous, egotistic, aggressive, inde-
cent, and unprincipled behavior appeared unalterable. Karpman
(1947) called their unreceptiveness to ethical training, treatment,
and punishment moral agenesis. “In general,” Kennard (1953,
p. 101) wrote, “the psychopathic personality is said to be the
individual who has little or no moral sense or social responsi-
bility and who, in consequence, performs acts which are amoral
or antisocial without sufficient sense of guilt to restrain future
performance.” These character traits often manifested in crime.
Experts noted the overlap between psychopathy and delinquency.
Some even stated that delinquency was a criterion for the diagno-
sis (Preu, 1944; McCord and McCord, 1956; Craft, 1966). Hence,
differentiating between the mentally disordered psychopath and
the mere criminal was difficult; a momentous difference with
regard to legal responsibility (Gibbens, 1951; Conrad, 1959;Ward,
2010). Contributing to these difficulties was the obscurity of the
causes of psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality. An editorial
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to a special issue on the psychopathic offender in the British
Journal of Delinquency in 1951 stated that “our understanding of
psychopathy is still rudimentary and our researches wretchedly
inadequate” (Anonymous, 1951, p. 77). Neurological evidence
was particularly scarce: the functioning of the living brain of psy-
chopaths was inscrutable. This situation changed dramatically
when a new research tool became available in the 1930s.
THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY (EEG)
Electroencephalography—the recording of the brain’s electrical
activity—had a slow start. Certain electrical properties of the
nervous system had been known since the late eighteenth cen-
tury, yet only in the 1920s the German neurologist Hans Berger
constructed a device that registered an electrical rhythm on the
human scalp. In the 1930s, Edgar Adrian replicated and popular-
ized Berger’s findings, stimulating the use of EEG as research tool
in neurology and psychiatry (Brazier, 1961; Borck, 2005a). The
new technology spread from Germany, to Great Britain, and the
United States along different trajectories in the respective national
contexts. The initial slow start was followed by a massive growth
“[a]s the field of EEG expanded after World War II with the
speed and vigor of a prairie fire” (Adrian, 1963/1950; Knott, 2009,
p. 155). In the 1940s, various EEG laboratories emerged, con-
gresses were held, an EEG journal was launched, and professional
societies originated (e.g., the American Electroencephalographic
Society was founded in 1946) (Niedermeyer and Lopes da Silva,
1987; Stone and Hughes, 2013). Experts valued the EEG signal
as reliable indicator of brain function. The new technology soon
proved great utility in the study of epilepsy and the localization
of tumors. What other riddles might EEG help to solve? What
hidden meaning was encoded in the changing amplitude and
frequency of the brain waves? Researchers began to explore the
potential of the new technology, applying it to all sorts of neu-
rological, psychiatric, and psychological phenomena. In his mar-
velous book on the cultural history of electroencephalography,
Borck (2005a, p. 232) described the situation as follows: “with
the scientific recognition of the EEG as valid parameter for brain
function the entirety of human life from procreation to death
could count as object for electroencephalographic investigation,
and indeed almost no human activity was left without a repre-
sentation in form of an EEG-curve.” Starting in the late 1930s,
EEG studies on intelligence, personality, psychosis, homosexual-
ity, and peptic ulcers began appearing (Davis and Davis, 1939;
Lindsley, 1944; Ellingson, 1954). Around the same time, “the
wondrous eyes” of EEG caught sight of psychopathy, delinquency,
and immorality.
THE EEG OF PSYCHOPATHY, DELINQUENCY, AND
IMMORALITY IN THE 1940s AND 1950s
THE INCEPTION: EARLY EEG TRACES OF UNWANTED BEHAVIOR AND A
SPROUTING HOPE
In 1938, a study with the title “Electroencephalographic analyses
of behavior problem children” appeared in the American Journal
of Psychiatry. The authors claimed that the EEG records of so-
called behavior problem children deviated from those of normal
children (Jasper et al., 1938). This was one of the first studies that
identified traces of unwanted behavior in the electrical activity
of the nervous system. What is more, the logic of the conducted
comparison exemplified a seminal assumption of the study:
behavioral aberration correspondents to abnormal brain waves;
deviant people have deviant brain functioning. This momentous
speculation guided research in the years to come. Soon more
experts conducted EEG research on behavior problem children
and delinquent boys whose abnormal brain waves made it seem
likely that “[t]hese children will furnish some of the [. . .] psy-
chopaths of their generation” (Lindsley and Cutts, 1940; Brown
and Solomon, 1942, p. 264; Gallagher et al., 1942; Gottlieb et al.,
1945; Michaels, 1945). Accordingly, psychopaths and criminals
attracted experts’ attention in the 1940s. East and west of the
Atlantic, researchers attached electrodes to the scalps of inmates
of specialized asylums and prisons. In Great Britain, Denis Hill,
Desmond Pond, David Stafford-Clarke, Trevor Charles Noel
Gibbens—all with ties to the Maudsley Hospital in London—
formed the forefront, with William Grey Walter and others con-
tributing and commenting. In the United States, initially Frederic
and Erna Gibbs at Harvard (Cambridge, Massachusetts), John
Knott and colleagues at the Iowa Psychopathic Hospital (Iowa
City, Iowa), and Daniel Silverman at the Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners (Springfield, Missouri) studiedmisdemeanants’
brain waves, inspiring others to follow them.
Researchers had high hopes for the new, promising tool. The
enthusiasm reflected in Lennox’ remark about “moral turpitude”
not being sin, but disease reflected by “disordered brain waves”
(see above) reverberated through several early EEG publications.
The hopes clustered around four themes: diagnosis, classification,
etiology, and treatment of the unethical and unlawful. Improving
diagnosis could be attained by EEG’s capacity to provide “objec-
tive data” (Hill and Sargant, 1943, p. 527) which might purge
subjectivity from diagnosis (Gibbens et al., 1955). Furthermore,
EEG could aid to elucidate biological nuances in psychopathic
personalities that evaded the eye of the psychiatrist (Diethelm
and Simons, 1946). With regard to etiology, EEG could rule out
tumors or epilepsy as causes for immoral behavior and could
illuminate an organic origin of psychopathy and delinquency
(Silverman, 1947). Also, EEG established “new vistas for therapy”
(Silverman, 1943, p. 30) which promised improved therapeu-
tic success (Knott and Gottlieb, 1943). A few researchers even
speculated on EEG’s power in determining criminal responsibil-
ity (Stafford-Clark and Taylor, 1949; Conrad, 1959). Yet, others
accentuated the limited value of EEG in psychiatry (Lindsley,
1944; Walter, 1944). But even amongst the critics, there were
hopes that “when the new techniques are perfected” (Walter,
1944, p. 73), psychiatry and criminology might profit (see also
Levy and Kennard, 1953). In general, hopes were fraught with
uncertainty: in the 1940s, nobody knew whether EEG could
deliver on its promise to define, classify, explain, and treat psy-
chopathy, delinquency, and immorality.
DEFINING THE “elephant”: EEG IN DIAGNOSIS AND CLASSIFICATION
“I can’t define an elephant; but I know one when I see one.”
(Curran and Mallinson, 1944, p. 266)
When the first brain waves of immoral people unfurled, informed
judgments on their composition, their supposed oddity, and
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their meaning were needed. The criterion of choice was com-
parative: experts gauged the deviation between EEG curves of
abnormal and normal people. The deviation was then inter-
preted as neurological trace of unethical behavior. Such traces
were abundant: Hill and Watterson (1942) reported EEG abnor-
malities in aggressive psychopaths. Knott and Gottlieb (1943,
1944) stated that about half of the psychopathic personalities in
their sample had abnormal EEG. Silverman (1943) found approx-
imately the same abnormality ratio in psychopathic criminals.
Something seemed out of tune in the brain rhythms of psy-
chopaths. Moreover, there appeared to be distinct degrees of
abnormality for different psychopathic sub-groups. For example,
Silverman (1943) reported diverging percentages of abnormality
for hostile, hedonistic, inadequate, and homosexual psychopaths.
However, EEG did not detect deviant rhythms in mere crim-
inals (Hill and Watterson, 1942; Silverman, 1944a). Robbery,
larceny, murder, sex offences, assault and battery were untrace-
able in the brain waves—as a whole and as individual categories
(Gibbs et al., 1945). Nevertheless, dividing psychiatric or legal
categories into sub-classes in order to search for distinct EEG
abnormalities was common. Stafford-Clark and Taylor (1949)
split the offences of murderers into incidental, clearly motivated,
apparently motiveless, sexually motivated, and driven by insan-
ity. Their results were somewhat puzzling: motiveless murder was
clearly associated with an abnormal EEG whereas the abnormal-
ity was negligible for other types of murder. Seemingly, the EEG
could be of use in discerning different types of psychopaths and
criminals; but could the new technology aid in delineating psy-
chopaths from criminals? Starting in 1948, a major British study
investigated the psychopath in prison with the aim of deciding
this question and improving the diagnostic criteria for psychopa-
thy (Stafford-Clark et al., 1951; Hill and Pond, 1952; Gibbens
et al., 1955, 1959). Gibbens and colleagues collected psychological
and electrophysiological evidence on a fairly constant sample of
incarcerated psychopaths for several years, finding—among other
things—that EEG abnormality was “four times as frequently in
the psychopaths as in the controls” (Gibbens et al., 1955, p. 131).
In a similar vein, an American study suggested different degrees
of EEG abnormality to correlate with type and severity of crime
(Levy and Kennard, 1953).
However, abnormality was a coarse criterion. It was crucially
dependent on what was deemed normal (see Analysis below).
Some researchers responded to this caveat by tightening the crite-
ria for abnormality on the behavioral and the electrophysiological
level, resulting in negligible differences between psychopaths and
controls (Simon et al., 1946). Generally, more refined criteria
for the classification of brain waves could aid to improve accu-
racy and consistency in the nascent discipline. What exactly did
abnormality consist in? And, were there characteristic aspects of
the EEG signal that signified badness? In general, brain waves
could be too fast or too slow (Hill and Watterson, 1942). The
early studies had indicated slowness—that is, low frequency—
as conspicuous aspect in EEG recordings of behavior problem
children. In this context, particularly the theta rhythm (4–7
cycles per second) was a promising candidate. Several studies
reported slow activity in general or theta activity in partic-
ular in the EEG of psychopaths and criminals. For example,
Ostow and Ostow (1946) noted the strong correlation between
specific slow activity and antisocial behavior in a diverse group of
inmates (Knott and Gottlieb, 1943; Hill, 1944; Sessions Hodge,
1945; Stafford-Clark et al., 1951; Hill and Pond, 1952). Based
on these findings, a few researchers proposed classifications for
certain sub-groups of psychopathy predicated on distinct wave
patterns. Simons and Diethelm (1946, p. 622) observed that “psy-
chopathic personalities with poor ethical standards and resulting
social difficulties” exhibited “moderately slow activity,” which set
them apart from other psychopaths. For the sake of simplicity,
Kennard (1956, p. 109) separated “the pure and the aggressive
psychopath, solely because these correspond to particular EEG
patterns.”
Yet, all these attempts were provisional. EEG seemingly picked
up abnormal signals from abnormal people, but the degree and
type of abnormality varied (Cohn, 1949; Hill and Parr, 1963).
Accordingly, some psychopaths had abnormal EEG others did
not. This generated ideas about there being two types of psy-
chopathic personality: one with normal and one with abnormal
EEG (Knott and Gottlieb, 1944). Many experts conceded that the
observation and identification of certain rhythms were of lim-
ited diagnostic utility: the EEG was merely a supplement—not
a substitute—to psychiatric assessment (Diethelm and Simons,
1946; Silverman, 1947; Hill, 1952). Moreover, EEG-based classi-
fications of psychiatric or criminal subgroups were speculative at
best and oftenmet with criticism. Psychiatric categories in general
did not correspond to electrophysiological categories. Research
results were irritatingly inconsistent. Researchers identified rea-
sons for this incongruity in conceptual confusion and inadequate
samples. Psychopathy was a wastebasket and delinquency a broad
category. Samples consisted of diverse mental and neurologic
patients as well as unequal criminals (Karpman, 1948; Hill, 1952;
Kennard, 1953, 1956; McCord and McCord, 1956, 1964; Craft,
1966; Syndulko, 1978). The desire for an anatomical definition of
psychopathy or delinquency could not be satisfied with the EEG
(Cason, 1948; Sessions Hodge and Walter, 1953).
“cerebral dysrhythmia”: EEG IN ETIOLOGY AND THERAPY
Could EEG contribute to establish badness as dysfunction of
genes, bodies, and brains in the 1940s? The potential of EEG
lay in its capability to unveil brain function. If EEG curves indi-
cated brain function, then—so the reasoning went—aberrant
curves signified cerebral dysfunction. Yet, it was not known pre-
cisely how, where, and why “cerebral dysrhythmia” (see Hill,
1944) originated. Several researchers surmized an inborn defect
as cause that was passed on through generations (Williams,
1941; Gottlieb et al., 1947; Knott et al., 1953). To others, EEG
data made clear “that the psychopath possesses a brain which
is malfunctioning, and which has been malfunctioning since
early childhood” (Knott and Gottlieb, 1943; Silverman, 1943,
p. 28). The undecided question whether deviant brain waves
were signs of aberrant heredity, or of malfunctioning brains,
or both, complicated matters regarding the etiology of badness.
Explanations using EEG were often of rather general nature:
experts associated “‘good’ personality and ‘good’ EEG” (Kennard,
1953, p. 104) or stability of brain waves with stability of person-
ality (Ehrlich and Keogh, 1956). Explanations of psychopathy in
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 232 | 4
Schirmann History of EEG of immorality
particular referred to “disturbed cortical function” (Silverman,
1944b, p. 439), “defect in physiologic functioning” (Diethelm
and Simons, 1946, p. 411), or “elasticity in [. . .] neural limits”
(Knott and Gottlieb, 1944, p. 519). Out of these rather broad
attempts at etiology, two more concrete theories emerged that
testified to the role of EEG as theory inspiring tool (Cf. Borck,
2005a, p. 264).
Psychopaths’ childlike impulsivity, their lack of forethought
and restraint along with the fact that many bearing the label
were in their early twenties suggested that the condition con-
sisted in a failure to mature (Mangun, 1942). In addition,
the EEG curves of psychopaths resembled those of children,
whereas normal adults’ brain waves followed a distinct pat-
tern. Thus, cortical immaturity mirrored behavioral immatu-
rity, suggesting that psychopaths’ brains were underdeveloped.
The observation that the peculiar EEG abnormalities decreased
with age corroborated the so-called cortical immaturity hypothe-
sis (Hill and Watterson, 1942; Silverman, 1944a; Schwab, 1951;
Hill, 1952). With regard to therapy, this indicated that anti-
social, criminal, and immoral behavior was arrested develop-
ment and that it cured itself through aging. Just as the cortical
immaturity hypothesis, the second relevant theory of the day
was based on a similarity of the brain waves of two dis-
tinct groups of people. By visualizing dysrhythmia, the EEG
had proven to be a useful tool in the diagnosis of epilepsy.
Dysrhythmia, or more generally, abnormal EEG also showed
in the records of aggressive, criminal, and psychopathic peo-
ple (Hill, 1944; Ostow and Ostow, 1946). The idea that “latent
epilepsy” (see Brill and Walker, 1945) caused these behaviors,
opened up new options for therapy. If anticonvulsive drugs allevi-
ated epilepsy, theymight also reduce aggression and anti-sociality.
Correspondingly, behavior problem children, delinquents, and
psychopaths were treated with anticonvulsants in explorative tri-
als (Brown and Solomon, 1942; Silverman, 1944b). Yet, other
experts soon contested the similarity of epilepsy and misbe-
havior because it owed its existence to a “regrettable fault of
logic” (Sessions Hodge and Walter, 1953, p. 163). Dysrhythmia
in the brain waves of epileptic and immoral people was not
identical. Vague terminology had misled proponents of EEG in
their suggestion for treatment (Hill and Pond, 1952; Sessions
Hodge and Walter, 1953). Nevertheless, EEG contributed to
the framing of immoral and unlawful behavior as neurobio-
logical disorder: “The attitude that the psychopath may be a
sick individual rather than a bad one receives some support
from brain wave studies” (Brill and Walker, 1945, p. 549).
Correspondingly, Silverman (1944a) called for changes in the
medico-legal system and for special institutions for these seem-
ingly irremediable individuals (on legal issues, see Conrad,
1959).
ANALYSIS: EEG, IMMORALITY, AND METHODOLOGICAL
UNCERTAINTY
EEG research on immoral people’s brain waves produced
cursory and inconsistent findings. Breakthroughs were not
attained. Researchers deliberated on contradictory results and
review articles documented the heterogeneity of the findings
(Kennard, 1953, 1956; Ellingson, 1954). Amidst the confusion,
admonishing voices raised concerns regarding the utility of EEG
in psychiatry and criminology (Walter, 1944; Gibbs and Gibbs,
1964). Simultaneously, an expert debate on the origin, produc-
tion, meaning, and interpretation of the EEG took place in the
1940s and 1950s. In this context, the power of EEG as research
tool and especially its scope of application were critically dis-
cussed. This methodological debate pervaded EEG research on
unethical persons and is of great significance in understanding
its historical trajectory. In what follows, I analyze methodological
and theoretical issues that impeded the acuity of vision of “the
wondrous eyes” of the EEG.
“a relatively new yardstick” AND A MYSTERIOUS SIGNAL
“Only very few objective facts stand out in the sea of confusion
surrounding the concept of psychopathic personality. The brain
wave pattern is such a fact. This pattern cannot be disguised or
falsified.” (Ehrlich and Keogh, 1956, p. 286)
Were brain waves really objective, factual, precise, and valid?
Parenthetically Gottlieb et al. (1945, p. 138) described EEG as
“a relatively new yardstick.” This metaphor captured the uncer-
tainty associated with the new technology in its early days. EEG
as a “new yardstick” referred to two-fold novelty: a new tech-
nological device and a new measurement method. Firstly, the
technological device differed between laboratories. Scattered lab-
oratory technicians engineered their own electroencephalographs
with diverging electrodes, channels, and amplifiers. In addition,
the technology was constantly developed further in the 1940s and
1950s (Collura, 1993; Rösler, 2005). Gibbens et al. (1955, p. 131)
commented on this issue in one of their follow-up studies on
criminal psychopaths: “EEG technique has made great strides in
the last 5 years; study by modern methods might have revealed
much more valuable information.” Thus, EEG technology var-
ied geographically and transformed in the period under review
with unclear consequences for data production and compara-
bility of findings (Kennard, 1953; Adrian, 1963/1950; Fabisch,
1966). Secondly, EEG data was mysterious and its relation to
the mind nebulous (Borck, 2005b). It was generally agreed that
the EEG signal reflected electrical activity of the nervous sys-
tem, but the precise neurophysiological origin remained obscure
(Jasper, 1948; Cohn, 1949; Walter, 1950; Schwab, 1951; Cobb,
1971). Additionally, the proportion of signal and noise in the
brain wave was not entirely clear. Researchers criticized others for
taking artifacts to be data (Walter, 1944). Also, the EEG signal
was volatile: movement, as well as physiological and psycho-
logical states disrupted it. Eye-movement, blood sugar, epilepsy,
flickering light, hyperventilation, age, relaxation, sleep—all of
these and other determinants altered the brain waves. Some
alterations were distinct and already classified; others were still
being sorted out. The measurement tool was in the process of
being calibrated. The resulting uncertainty impacted knowledge
production. For example, Gibbs et al. (1945) qualified their ini-
tial statements on the incidence of abnormal EEG in criminals
once they accounted for age as confounding variable. Hence, the
“yardstick” was under permanent construction in the 1940s and
1950s.
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THE ART OF INTERPRETATION
“[. . .] the interpretation of the EEG is still an art which must be
learned through experience.” (Silverman, 1947, p. 74)
In addition to the unknown origin and partly indeterminate con-
stitution of the EEG signal, its meaning was encrypted: brain
waves were not self-explanatory. Rather they were a code in need
of decipherment (Davis, 1938; Borck, 2005b, 2008). A classifica-
tory and interpretative system needed to be devised. Accordingly,
experts classified alternating amplitude and frequency as distinct
wave patterns (e.g., theta-rhythm), related these rhythms to dis-
tinct physiological or psychological phenomena (e.g., sleep), and
in so doing charged the electrical signals with meaning. The diffi-
culty to make sense of EEG curves increased with the complexity
of the phenomena studied. Complex psychological and social
phenomena, such as delinquency, did not express themselves in
simple wave patterns. Despite the growing availability of EEG data
owing to the spread and refinement of the technology, interpreta-
tion remained demanding. This illustrates the essential difference
between producing EEG data and making sense of them by
means of interpretation. Making sense of brain waves, however,
was saturated with subjectivity: “[i]n short, no two electroen-
cephalographers interpret all EEG’s in exactly the same manner”
(Williams, 1941; Ellingson, 1954, p. 264; Syndulko, 1978). Thus,
contradictory findings could result from researchers’ bias, stem-
ming from differences in experience, training and skill (Gibbs and
Gibbs, 1941; Lindsley, 1944; Silverman, 1947). Moreover, the art
of interpretation changed over time and was susceptible to fash-
ions (Sessions Hodge and Walter, 1953; Cobb, 1971). Attempts
to improve interpretation aimed at eradicating subjective ele-
ments. For example, over the years automated analysis procedures
replaced the “naked-eye method of analysis” (Greenblatt and
Sittinger, 1950, p. 313). Trained judgment thus was heteroge-
neous and was frequently considered as a source of bias that
vitiated the objectivity of EEG research (Daston and Galison,
2007).
NORMALITY AND ABNORMALITY IN THE MAKING
“It is tantalising, at present, to see the elaborate records of electri-
cal oscillations, to know that they are, in some measure at least,
a picture of the activity of the human brain, but to be unable to
interpret the picture except to say where it is grossly distorted.”
(Adrian, 1963/1950)
Gross distortion was what EEG could detect; gross distortion
compared to what? Gauging data as abnormal required a norm.
Normality as a reference category, however, had to be ascertained.
Around 1940, normal EEG was poorly defined and, hence, clas-
sifications of abnormality varied (Jasper et al., 1938; Williams,
1941; Bloch and Hill, 1982). Around a decade later, Hill (1952,
p. 440) described the prevailing biases in earlier years with the
statement: “[w]hat is abnormal to some is, still, normal to others.”
In addition to the above described fickleness of the EEG signal,
approximately 15 per cent of normal people had abnormal EEG.
The reliability of EEG as indicator for brain dysfunction was in
question. As a countermeasure, experts attempted to constitute
normality. Multiple, partly contradictory classification systems
and norming samples coexisted; an influential one being Gibbs
and Gibbs’ (1941) comprehensive Atlas of Electroencephalography.
However, variability in normality continued to hamper research
well into the 1950s, rendering earlier studies on immoral persons’
abnormal brain waves disputable (Schwab, 1951; Sessions Hodge
and Walter, 1953; Ellingson, 1954; Kennard, 1956; Hill and Parr,
1963). Along with the standards for normality, the standards for
doing proper science with EEG were changing.
ACKNOWLEDGING PROBLEMS, SEEKING REMEDIES, AND CHANGING
THE RULES
One of the most striking features of the early EEG research on
psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality was the researchers’
almost unanimous agreement on the associated methodological
problems. Proponents of the new technology frequently high-
lighted the poor understanding of the EEG signal, the technolog-
ical difficulties and idiosyncrasies in its production, the subjectiv-
ity in its interpretation, the arbitrariness of normality as reference
category, the limits in EEG’s diagnostic utility, the inadequacy of
the samples, and the heterogeneity of the people and concepts
studied. Moreover, they acknowledged the tentativeness of their
findings and often presented their theorizing as mere speculation.
For example, Sessions Hodge (1945, p. 472) opens a paper with
the statement that it “should be considered a preliminary com-
munication, tentative and suggestive.” The prevalent comments
on the premature, provisional, and inchoate state of the research
testified to its predominantly explorative nature. Reconnaissance
appeared to be the main goal. In the process of exploration,
researchers identified shortcomings. Knowledge production was
somewhat insular and its means so diverse that results from
different laboratories were often incommensurable (Kennard,
1953; Ellingson, 1954; Syndulko, 1978). Recognition of the puta-
tive problems allowed for tackling them. Accordingly, experts
sought to remedy inconsistency, heterogeneity, and diversity. The
aspired cure lay in unifying research methods: standardization
was the key.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the scientific community launched
extensive initiatives to standardize EEG research. There appeared
to be great need in every associated area. In the first issue of the
newly established Journal of Electroencephalography and Clinical
Neurophysiology, Grey Walter (1949, p. 474) stated: “If we are
to understand one another at all, our language must contain
agreed terms and symbols, conventional signs and scales, yet must
admit originality.” Experts, then, did not speak the same language.
Terminological confusion continued to be a problem. Until 1961,
even the most essential aspect of EEG, the wave, had not been
defined (Brazier et al., 1961). The administration of anticonvul-
sive drugs to psychopathic criminals owing to a misinterpretation
of the term dysrhythmia (see above) was a noteworthy con-
sequence of the unstandardized language (see also Hill, 1952).
Diverging electrode placement was another cause of dissimilitude
identified in the late 1940s. As a countermeasure, committees sug-
gested unifying the positions of the electrodes on the scalp (Jasper,
1958). Furthermore, the already mentioned attempts to estab-
lish norming samples to homogenize judgments on abnormality
(e.g., Gibbs and Gibbs, 1941) and the introduction of automated
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data analysis procedures to reduce subjectivity in interpretation of
data (Niedermeyer and Lopes da Silva, 1987) demonstrated how
researchers scrutinized and changed the standards of the science
in the period under review. Rules for data production, interpre-
tation, and analysis were in transition: the calibration of EEG was
on ongoing process.
CONCLUSION ON THE PAST: “The wondrous eyes” OF THE EEG IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The emergence of EEG in the 1930s had opened up an uncharted
epistemic terrain; a frontier worth exploring. The anticipation
was great. Unable to predict what seminal discoveries EEG might
facilitate, experts applied the new research tool to all sorts of
psychological phenomena.
Yet, they operated under uncertainty with the novel method.
The science was in its infancy: brain waves were mysterious.
Data accumulation was somewhat haphazard and rarely driven by
hypotheses. The new research tool needed to be handled, under-
stood, and gauged. Standards, rules, and guidelines for using EEG
were only in the making and research proceeded in the absence
of specified methodological criteria. The lack of knowledge and
constraints created scientific freedom: in the early days of EEG
research almost anything went. Simultaneously, a debate on the
limits and potentials of EEG took place. The reliability, the valid-
ity, and the scope of application of EEG were being investigated,
negotiated, and determined. Proponents of EEG acknowledged
tentativeness, identified shortcomings, introduced remedies, and
established criteria for doing proper science with the new tech-
nology in the process. Thus, knowledge production with EEG,
calibration of EEG, and sense-making of psychopathic, delin-
quent, and immoral persons via EEG occurred simultaneously in
the 1940s and 1950s.
In this period, “the wondrous eyes” of EEG wandered over
immoral persons’ brains without spotting significant character-
istics. The findings were inconclusive. There were no compre-
hensive EEG-based theories that connected the results or satis-
factorily explained human badness. The new technology failed
to deliver the hoped for revelations regarding diagnosis, classi-
fication, etiology, and therapy. In general, the contribution of
EEG to psychiatry proved disappointing (Walter, 1944; Schwab,
1951; Borck, 2008). In the 1960s, Gibbs and Gibbs (1964, p. 460)
commented: “The electroencephalographic study of psychiatric
disorders has yielded surprisingly little information. This does
not mean that it is of no value, but the electroencephalographer
should not deceive himself; his technique does not convert psy-
chiatric disorder into an ‘open book’.” Consensus formed that the
complexity of psychiatric disorder could not be reduced to brain
waves. Accordingly, experts gradually attenuated their hopes and
acknowledged that the immoral brain remained inscrutable and
intractable despite the novel technological outlook. In hindsight,
researchers attributed the perceived failure of EEG to method-
ological problems: ill-defined concepts, contaminated samples,
wanting norming samples, unstandardized technology, unclear
terminology, and cryptic data had disabled research (Ellingson,
1954; Hill and Parr, 1963; Craft, 1966; Syndulko, 1978). Rather
than clarifying the picture, EEG had added to the obscurity
by providing an alternative, yet distorted image of wickedness.
After 1960 EEG in general was beyond its zenith (Niedermeyer
and Lopes da Silva, 1987). The hype surrounding the new
technology abated. Correspondingly, EEG research on unethi-
cal and unlawful persons lost momentum, though studies kept
on appearing in the following decades (Volavka, 1987; Milstein,
1988; Raine, 1993; Dolan, 1994). Although there was no defi-
nite closure, researchers gradually neglected the brain waves of
psychopaths and delinquents and pursued the study of other
psychophysiological measures (e.g., skin conductance and heart
rate) (Hare, 1970). Today, EEG research continues, but shares the
observation of psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality with
the “wondrous eyes of a new technology.”
COMMENT ON THE PRESENT: A NOVEL SET OF EYES
In 1997, what is believed to be the first neuroimaging study on
psychopathy appeared (Intrator et al., 1997; see Hare, 2007). In
2001, the first functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies on moral judgment followed (Greene et al., 2001; Moll
et al., 2001). Up to the present, a host of neuroimaging research
on antisocial persons has been conducted (Fumagalli and Priori,
2012). Neuroimaging provided a novel set of eyes and an aus-
picious perspective on the immoral brain. Again, the new sight
promises new insights. The present situation in neuroimaging
resembles the early days of EEG research in the 1940s. Needless
to say, the technologies themselves, the research procedures, the
produced data, the definitions of immorality and psychopa-
thy, and the historical context differ markedly. However, certain
noteworthy parallels exist that merit a comparison.
Few topics evaded the prying eyes of the new technologies.
Experts used both to explore almost the entirety of the human
mind, ranging from economic decision-making to romantic love
(Abi-Rached and Rose, 2010; Gergen, 2010). The exploration
of freshly accessible phenomena entailed unsystematic data col-
lection in some areas with no apparent goal other than using
the new technologies. Both technologies operate on the same
tenet, stating that deranged, illicit, and unethical behavior can
be understood by studying the brain. This belief also promoted
the rise of biomedical experts, claiming specialist brain-based
knowledge about vice and virtue (Becker, 2012). Furthermore,
the emergence of both technologies sparked great hopes for the
study of psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality, accompa-
nied by rhetoric of promise that advertised their massive potential
and, for a certain time, perpetuated their application despite the
absence of ground-breaking discoveries. This rhetoric strategy
is exemplified by experts’ formulaic reservations that empha-
size the tentativeness of the findings along with calls for more
research found in almost every neuroscientific research report
(e.g., Anderson and Kiehl, 2012). Just as in the past, vignettes
for anti-social behavior continue to be equivocal, contributing
to contaminated research samples and related issues of comor-
bidity (Mullen, 2007; Pickersgill, 2009; Müller, 2010). Analysis
and interpretation of EEG and neuroimaging data was and is a
versatile art, with different approaches yielding unequal results
(Carp, 2012). The meaning and significance of the data regarding
the assessment of misdemeanants was and is equivocal and con-
tested. Over the years, EEG and neuroimaging were calibrated,
validated, and refined, altering the quality of the produced data
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(Logothetis, 2008). These processes of calibration and changing
styles of interpretation testify to the non-neutrality of brain-
focused methods. Making sense of the generated data was and is
a matter of human expertise defined by standards that changed in
the past and that are likely to change in the future. Thus, neither
EEG nor neuroimaging provide direct access to morality in the
brain; the access is restricted and mediated at best (Schirmann,
2013b). Neuroimaging aided to “change the picture” (Borck,
2008, p. 377) without remedying the persistent methodological
and theoretical shortcomings. By altering the view, neuroimag-
ing has provided clues, but certainly no incontrovertible evidence.
Hence, the immoral brain remains elusive in the present.
The commonalities between EEG and neuroimaging suggest
that history might have a lesson to offer. In the past, EEG enabled
a new perspective on psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality
and facilitated hopes for imminent research breakthroughs. In the
ensuing exploration of the power of the EEG, experts encoun-
tered constraints: their research tool was in need of calibration
and its utility restricted. EEG illuminated certain neurologic phe-
nomena (e.g., epilepsy), yet yielded negligible results in psychiatry
(e.g., criminal psychopathy). Hence, experts assessed the lim-
its and potentials of EEG and adjusted its scope of application,
neglecting it in the study of complex psychological and social
phenomena. In a similar vein, neuroimaging is—and should be—
up for discussion at the moment. Reliability, validity, utility, and
credibility of neuroimaging in the study of diverse psychological
and social phenomena are not a given, but are in need of criti-
cal acclaim. While neuroimaging has doubtlessly revolutionized
our understanding of brain functioning, it has failed to deliver
more than provisional evidence in forensic psychiatry and crimi-
nology. Just as with EEG, a fair appraisal and an informed critique
of neuroimaging are needed in order to illustrate its potentials
and mark its limitations. In conclusion, “the wondrous eyes” of
new research tools clearly enable novel perspectives, insights and
visions—yet it needs to be determined when, where, and how they
clarify sight or cloud the outlook.
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